The Role of Large Competitive Countries Versus Political Rent on Business

Revaz Lordkipanidze

Citation: Revaz Lordkipanidze, "The Role of Large Competitive Countries Versus Political Rent on Business", Universal Library of Business and Economics, Volume 01, Issue 01.

Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Using the methodology of laws of physics, article has developed an understanding of perfect competition and according to the new integral index of the force of economic competition, it turns out that homogeneous markets of large countries, if all other factors are eliminated, are more competitive. One of the factors of the integral index of the force of economic competition is directly expressed in the growth of the force of competition with the growth of market capacity, by analogy with the voltage of an electric current. Based on the above, hidden monopolies operate more easily in small countries and political dictatorships are more often expressed in small countries. Political dictatorships create such preconditions for the so-called political rent that without political power and or mafia connections with political leaders, success in business or any other field of human activity is impossible to achieve. Since large scales are more resistant to the evil of hidden monopolies, we must strengthen global anti-monopoly structures and fight crime together. JEL Classification: A10, P10, P17.


Keywords: Perfect Competition, Hidden Monopoly, Political Rent.

Download doi https://doi.org/10.70315/uloap.ulbec.2024.0101002